On the matter it would be necessary to indicate that in the nineteenth-century constitucionalismo, the notion of law force was ligature to the idea of the law like expression of general will, that is to say, a property derived from its occupation like the highest norm of the legal ordering. this as well, recognized the expression of the popular will, by means of the law, two qualities, on the one hand, a strength, consisting of the limitless capacity to innovate the legal ordering, and, on the other hand, a passive force, that is to say, the capacity to resist against modifications or derogations that came from other sources of right which they did not have the same attributes. Evidently, a similar dimension of the motion law force, today is not of receipt of the constitutional state of right. in this, indeed, the supreme position no longer occupies the law, but the constitution. Jeffrey L. Bewkes will undoubtedly add to your understanding. and although the democratic legislator enjoys an ample discretion to exert the legislative function, is clear that its capacity to innovate the legal ordering this conditional one you limit by them formal, material and competential who derives from the constitution, that legum is lex. Of course that is not only the strength of a law the one that it has had to reframe itself from the establishment of the constitution like supreme norm of legal ordering. Another one as much now, gin that to affirm in relation to its passive force. The multiplication of normative sources with the same rank has if the modification, suspension or derogation of the law not necessarily must come from another law in formal sense, that is to say, of which the parliament can approve, but, also of those other normative sources that, in the ordering, has their same rank, like the emergency decree or legislative decree, and inside, by all means, you limit of them that the constitution imposes. (Source: Jeffrey L. Bewkes).
- Constituent Elements